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The Issue of Normativity and the Methodological 
Implications of Interpretivism I: 
The Idea of Normative Guidance
Abstract. The article is the fi rst part of an analysis that seeks to clarify the distinctive normativity of law, as it is 
refl ected in the legal systems of constitutional democracies. It explores the ability of interpretive theories to 
capture the conceptual characteristics of the normativity of law. The normative guidance the law provides is 
characterised in terms of normative claims. Normative claims are construed as being based upon linking up 
expectations with practical reasons. The analysis lays out the conditions of providing normative guidance with the 
help of drawing a distinction between the success and effi cacy of normative claims. The success of normative 
claims is explained in terms of their substantive justifi catory background and the competence of those making 
them. The characterisation of the effi cacy of normative claims is based on the distinction between instrumental and 
non-instrumental reasons.  
Keywords: interpretivism, normative guidance, normative claim, practical reason, practical justifi cation, 
instrumental and non-instrumental reasons
The present article revolves around the distinctive normativity of law, and it will remain 
within the boundaries of conceptual analysis. I restrict myself to unpacking some of the 
conceptual implications of a more or less undisputed claim: ‘The law is a normative and 
institutional social practice.’1 I have kept returning to this point over the past few years,2 but 
I would like to provide a more systematic inquiry that aims at a higher level of 
methodological awareness. I try to be systematic even if it sometimes means that I make 
rather trivial claims or touch upon issues that cannot be addressed adequately here. I map 
the relevant issues as carefully as I can. 
I emphasise that this is primarily a methodological piece. My main concern is testing 
the ability of interpretive legal theories to capture the conceptual characteristics of the 
normativity of law. I explore the peculiarities, structures and limitations of interpretive 
theorising. 
The specifi c strategy of explication I deploy here is partly explained by the fact that I 
am not entirely happy with the way debates on normativity are conducted in the 
contemporary (mainstream) legal theoretical discourse. The issue of normativity has 
become a battleground where the controversy between legal positivism and the natural law 
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1 This claim as a slightly more specifi ed version of Neil MacCormick’s starting point for his 
account of law: ‘law is an institutional normative order.’ See his Institutions of Law. Oxford, 2008, 11.
2 See Bódig, M.: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati fi lozófi a: Jogelméleti módszertani vizsgálódások. 
Miskolc, 2004, chaps. 3–4 and 35. See also Bódig, M.: The Political Character of Legal Institutions 
and Its Conceptual Signifi cance. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 46 (2005) 1–2, 33–50, 34–36. 
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doctrine is played out.3 Analyses are too often driven mainly by the ambition to ‘wrong-
foot’ the opponents in that particular debate. Accounts of normativity are too often 
contextualised in ways that sideline important aspects of the methodological challenges 
involved. To resist this tendency, this time around, I do not write a polemic piece.4 Although 
I track the sources of the ideas I rely on, most of the time, I do not seek out the theorists 
who may have a quarrel with my account. I rarely criticise anyone directly. I want to 
circumvent most of the characteristic debates in contemporary legal theory (especially the 
methodological debates about legal positivism, descriptivism and the separation of law and 
morality). 
The substantive analysis that I offer is divided into four sections. The fi rst one outlines 
the methodological programme (that is tested in this article for its ability to account for the 
normativity of law). The second section focuses on the idea of normative guidance, and 
then the second sets out to clarify the relationship between normative claims and practical 
reasons. The fourth section brings together the conceptual elements elaborated in the 
previous two sections, and lays out an account of the normativity of law. As the analysis is 
rather extensive, the fourth section (together with the Conclusion) will be published in Part 
II of this article.5 Here, in Part I, I focus on the underlying methodological and conceptual 
issues without which the explication about the normativity of law in Part II would make 
little sense.
1. Interpretivism
I need to start with clarifying what I mean by interpretivism about legal theory. I associate 
the fundamental idea with a methodological challenge facing all legal theories. Each legal 
theory needs to rely on a ‘background epistemology’ that concerns the ways in which one 
can reveal theoretically relevant facts and ideas. The background epistemology provides the 
methodological basis for the truth-claims of the theory. This is what makes the theory 
intelligible – enabling others to fi gure out what counts as a justifi cation for the theory (or as 
a meaningful challenge to it). 
Interpretivism is one possible background epistemology for legal theory.6 Interpretive 
theories of law gather the ‘data’ that underlie their theoretical claims from participant 
communication about legal practices. They assume that the way competent participants 
(that is, mainly lawyers) communicate about the legal practice is revealing about the 
character of law. Interpretive theories construe law as a social practice whose features can 
3 Two of the important pieces demonstrate this point pretty clearly. Gerald Postema’s ‘The 
Normativity of Law’ [in: Ruth Gavison (ed.): Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy. Oxford, 
1987] is primarily a critical appraisal of Hart with a strong anti-positivist edge. Part Two of Jules 
Coleman’s The Practice of Principle (Oxford, 2001), entitled ‘The Possibility and Normativity of 
Law’, is mainly an apology of legal positivism.
4 I do not claim neutrality in the debate about positivism. See Bódig, M.: Interpretivism and 
Conventionalism: Contributions to the Critical Assessment of Contemporary Methodological Legal 
Positivism. In: Asifa, B. (ed.): Legal Positivism: Conceptual Approach. Hyderabad, 2008. See also 
Bódig, M.: Legal Positivism and the Limits of the Contemporary Legal Theoretical Discourse. 
German Law Journal, 12 (2011), 625–662.
5 See issue 3 of Acta Juridica Hungary (2013) (forthcoming).
6 Cf. Bódig: Interpretivism and Conventionalism... op. cit. 155–158. See also Bódig, M: 
Jogelmélet és gyakorlati fi lozófi a. op. cit. 446–455.
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be revealed, with suffi cient adequacy, by way of identifying juridical concepts and 
interpreting their characteristic uses in participant communication.7 
It was Herbert Hart who made interpretivism the dominant background epistemology 
for mainstream legal theories.8 It was a pivotal aspect of his methodological vision that the 
analysis of legal concepts must be interpretative (‘hermeneutic’).9 For him, the remit of 
legal theory was to elucidate the conceptual implications of our familiar ideas concerning 
law and our ways of communicating legal claims. Naturally, Hart’s interpretivism was 
developed as an integral part of his methodological positivist enterprise,10 and it is largely 
due to his infl uence that most contemporary positivists embrace interpretivism in some 
form.11 But interpretivism is not simply a positivist enterprise. Over the past few decades, a 
variety of interpretivist frameworks has emerged – a number of them designed for the 
purposes of post-positivist or anti-positivist theories.12 (Dworkin’s legal theory is probably 
the best known among them.13) Although there is a committed ‘anti-interpretivist’ strand in 
contemporary legal theory,14 I do believe that the spread of interpretivist methodology is an 
encouraging development.15 This is one of the good things that came out of Hart’s legal 
theory.
  7 As to alternative background epistemologies legal theory, one can think of transcendentalism 
(characteristic of Kelsen’s ‘pure theory of law’). See e.g. Hans Kelsen’s characterisation of ‘ought’ as 
a transcendental category in his Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory. Oxford, 1992, 23–25. 
Another alternative is empirical reductionism. For an instructive example, see the fi rst edition of Karl 
Olivecrona’s Law as Fact (London, 1939). And one can also reckon with the kind of constructivist 
legal epistemology that emerged in the 1980s. See Teubner, G.: How the Law Thinks: Toward a 
Constructivist Epistemology of Law. Law and Society Review, 23 (1989), 727–758.  
  8 As to its intellectual origins, Hartian interpretivism can be traced back to Max Weber’s 
‘interpretive’ methodology for sociology. Cf. Weber, M.: Economy and Society: An Outline of 
Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley (CA), 1978. For an account of the Weberian infl uence on Oxford 
jurisprudence, see Finnis, J.: Philosophy of Law. Oxford, 1991, 211. Weber’s ideas seem to have 
infl uenced Hart by way of Peter Winch’s seminal The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to 
Philosophy (London, 1958). For Hart’s reference on Winch, see his The Concept of Law. 2nd ed. 
Oxford, 1994, 289. For an analysis of the way Hart’s account is related to Winch, see Veronica 
Rodriguez-Blanco: Peter Winch and Hart, H. L. A.: Two Concepts of the Internal Point of View. 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 20 (2007), 453–473.
  9 See. Hart, H. L. A: Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Oxford, 1983, 13.
10 Cf. Bódig: Interpretivism and Conventionalism… op. cit. 158–161.
11 See e.g. Raz, J.: Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford, 1994, 215 and 237.
12 See MacCormick: Institutions of Law. op. cit. 5 and 295. For MacCormick’s post-positivist 
credo, see ibid. 278–279. For an anti-positivist version of interpretivism, see Simmonds, N. E.: Law 
as a Moral Idea. Oxford, 2007, esp. 23 and 55. Even John Finnis adopts an interpretivist starting 
point for his legal theory. See his Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford, 1982, 3.
13 See especially Dworkin, R.: Law’s Empire. London, 1986, 12–14. Some argue that 
interpretivism itself is to be identifi ed with Dworkinian jurisprudential methodology. See Stavropoulos, 
N.: Interpretivist Theories of Law. In: Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/law-interpretivist). I tend to think that such claims are misleading, and unduly simplify the 
development of interpretivism in legal theory.
14 See Moore, M. S.: The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse? Stanford 
Law Review, 41 (1989), 871–957. Postema, G. J.: Jurisprudence as Practical Philosophy. Legal 
Theory, 4 (1998), 329–357, 329–330.
15 Cf. Bódig: Interpretivism and Conventionalism… op. cit. 156–157. 
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The main attraction of interpretivism is that it enables theories to build on the familiar 
features of our legal practices. Interpretive legal theories work with (or, at least, start with) 
conceptual structures that should be readily recognisable for any competent practitioner. 
(They purport to work with familiar concepts like ‘right’, ‘rule’, ‘obligation’, ‘offi cial’, and 
calibrate their meaning on the way they are characteristically used by practitioners of law.) 
At fi rst glance, interpretivist theories seem to be uniquely well positioned to mediate 
successfully between abstract theoretical ideas and everyday experiences. 
But interpretivism is not without drawbacks. Some of its methodological implications 
are bound to raise quite tricky challenges. By defi nition, the interpretive data that the theory 
works with come from particular practices that are contingent and historically constituted. 
Interpretive data are rooted in participant communication about the practice. They are, 
ultimately, all contingent (and often controversial) discursive constructions. Their analytical 
relevance cannot be fully specifi ed outside the discursive context in which they were 
formed. As a result, by opting for interpretivism, the theorist brings into her account of law 
a good deal of contingency – and dealing with that contingency becomes one of her main 
methodological concerns. The theorist needs to be capable of skilfully ‘managing’ the 
interpretive data if she is to come up with plausible and important theoretical claims – 
insights that can go beyond the idiosyncrasies of particular practices. 
This is a particular challenge for theoretical accounts of normativity. Although 
participant communication is rich in interpretive data that are revealing about normative 
phenomena (mainly because lawyers have developed sophisticated terminologies for 
normative phenomena), it is diffi cult to fi nd participants who consciously use the very 
concept of ‘normativity’. The available interpretive data systematically underdetermine the 
theoretical accounts built upon them. 
Faced with such diffi culties, interpretive legal theory needs to fi ll conceptual gaps, and 
fi lter out some of the controversies among participants. (This is what I mean by managing 
the interpretive data.) If interpretivism is the background epistemology for the theory, 
defi nitional fi at will be a necessary part of managing the interpretive data. Interpretive 
analysis is likely to open up several pathways that lead to a variety of accounts of law with 
different theoretical advantages and disadvantages.16 I do not mean it as some sort of 
criticism. I see no reason to think that the challenges cannot be handled in a satisfactory 
manner–mainly because I am not particularly worried about the role of defi nitional fi at in 
legal theory. I cannot imagine how a legal theory can be free of defi nitional fi at (and why it 
should be). Theory-making is a constructive enterprise – especially in law. And, most 
importantly, I see no attractive methodological alternative to interpretivism in legal theory. 
Such methodological challenges point to at least three important methodological 
implications for an interpretivist account of law. The fi rst is that interpretivism sits uneasily 
with attempts to develop general theories of law (that are supposed to capture the conceptual 
foundations for all possible legal systems). Although the stark issues that interpretivism 
raises about the viability of general theories of law are important and revealing, I will not 
pursue them in any detail here.17 I just note that I have no use for a general theory of law, 
16 Cf. Bódig: Legal Positivism and the Limits… op. cit. 658–660. See also Perry, S.: 
Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory. In: Marmor, A. (ed.): Law and Interpretation: 
Essays in Legal Philosophy. Oxford, 1995, 123. 
17 For my earlier take on the issue, see my Jogelmélet és gyakorlati fi lozófi a. op. cit. 450–451. 
See also Waldron, J.: Can There Be a Democratic Jurisprudence? Emory Law Journal, 58 (2009), 
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and I do not attempt to provide one. I theorise about the legal systems that my interpretive 
data come from: certain incarnations of ‘state-law’,18 the legal systems of a few 
constitutional democracies.
The second implication of interpretivism is that there is no reason why interpretive 
analysis should stop at the conventional topics of legal theory (like the concept of ‘legal 
obligation’ or the relationship between law and morality). The available interpretive data 
associate the law with political ideas and values that profoundly shape the way that law is 
perceived by the participants of the practice. Interpretive legal theory cannot easily pass 
such issues (like the legitimacy of law) on to normative political theory. Interpretive 
analysis can and should extend to political values that are constitutive of legitimating 
discourses systematically linked to the legal practice. This is a crucial methodological issue 
for legal theory but I set it aside here as well (except for a few comments at the very end in 
Part II). 
I dedicate this analysis to a third implication of the methodological peculiarities of 
interpretivism: one should come to terms with the ‘double contingency’ of theoretical 
accounts. On the one hand, the explanatory scope of an interpretive theory is limited by the 
contingency of its interpretive data (that tie it to particular and historically constituted 
practices). On the other hand, the explanatory scope of an account of law is limited by the 
contingency of the conceptual devices that are used to organise the interpretive data into a 
coherent structure. My chief ambition in this piece is to explore the interplay of interpretive 
data and defi nitional fi at in interpretive theorising – mainly because it is so rarely 
acknowledged. For that reason, I do not even try to offer the one and only plausible account 
of normativity of law. My account is one of several possible accounts that an intelligent 
observer or participant can put together from the conceptual elements ‘fl oating’ around in 
mainstream legal theory (when we refl ect on ordinary experiences of law in a contemporary 
constitutional democracy).
Embracing contingency in this way may be unusual in contemporary legal theory. But, 
to me, this is the inevitable implication of a crucial methodological point: I deny that 
particular accounts of the conceptual features of law can be equally adequate for the 
purposes of sociological, doctrinal and critical understandings of law.19 I also believe that 
the kind of contingency I embrace raises no methodological diffi culty for legal theoretical 
efforts that are consciously and carefully adjusted to well-defi ned theoretical ambitions. My 
own analysis, for one, is targeted to doctrinal understandings of law. In an important sense, 
this analysis is part of my efforts to develop a methodological perspective for legal theory 
that facilitates fruitful communication with legal doctrinal scholarship.20 
Before I start my analysis in earnest, I must note a few features of the way this piece 
has been constructed. As I have mentioned above, my analysis is structured by a way of 
combining the interpretation of ordinary legal experiences and acts of defi nitional fi at. To 
keep their interplay more transparent, I have organised the discussion in a way that makes 
675–712, 675–679. For a sophisticated defence of the idea of general jurisprudence, see Raz, J.: 
Between Authority and Interpretation. Oxford, 2009, 17–46. 
18 Cf. MacCormick: Institutions of Law. op. cit. 12 and 169.
19 See Bódig, M.: Legal Theory and Legal Doctrinal Scholarship. Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, 23 (2010), 483–514, 510–513. 
20 See ibid. 494–506.
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them easier to distinguish. Although I use a real-life example as my guide, the analysis is 
‘front-loaded’ with elements of defi nitional fi at. (Most importantly, they permeate the way I 
make sense of the idea of ‘normative guidance.’) I wanted to avoid ‘drip-feeding’ my 
readers with contingent conceptual devices scattered all over the analysis. I wanted to make 
clear how much of defi nitional fi at is really required for an account of even moderate 
complexity in an interpretivist framework. I specify a terminology without claiming that it 
is directly warranted by the practices I talk about. Alternative terminologies may be no less 
adequate. My terminology comes mostly from intuition calibrated on contemporary 
theoretical literature, and articulated with a view to the conceptual needs of this particular 
investigation. In later sections, where I talk of law more specifi cally, I offer more from 
genuine interpretive analysis. This is especially characteristic of my account of the 
distinctive normativity of law in Part II. But even there, I remain on a pretty abstract level. 
All through the analysis, I use interpretive data sparingly.21 A more detailed interpretive 
analysis would have been a whole lot more extensive: it would have prevented me from 
providing an account that is at least ‘structurally complete’. Even when I give a different 
impression, this remains a predominantly methodological piece: the abstract demonstration 
of a methodological vision. 
2. The idea of normative guidance: the preliminaries
The interpretive data on normativity are frighteningly complex but they seem to converge 
on an abstract point: normative phenomena are inherently connected to human action. In all 
their forms, they are about guiding human action (specifying, in one way or another, what 
to do) and providing standards of evaluation.22 Normative claims and normative 
mechanisms are directed at infl uencing human action, and they fulfi l their distinctive 
functions only if they have an impact on how actions are formed or action problems are 
perceived and evaluated. In other words, the conceptual core of the idea of normativity is 
that of normative guidance. Our fi rst task is to explore this very idea in some detail.
2.1. An example: the prohibition of direct discrimination
To stay true to the interpretive character of my methodological vision, I conduct an analysis 
organised around a particular normative claim that I take from the contemporary law of the 
United Kingdom. I will try to make sense of its ability to provide normative guidance. I 
deliberately chose an example that is a relatively recent addition to statutory law, and that 
makes perfect sense as a mere moral or political claim. That will allow me to have a look at 
it as a non-legal norm before asking what happened to it, in terms of its normative character, 
when it came to be institutionalised in legal form.
The norm I analyse is the statutory prohibition of direct discrimination. This is what 
makes it true to say that ‘Treating others less favourably on certain prohibited grounds is 
illegal in the United Kingdom.’ Although British lawyers would agree that this is true, there 
21 I also rely on a narrow informational basis: my interpretive data mainly come from the legal 
system of the United Kingdom. But I could have used equivalent interpretive data from the legal 
system of any other constitutional democracy I am familiar with – like Hungary.
22 This is, admittedly, a Hartian way of capturing what normativity lies in. See e.g. Hart, H. L. 
A.: Essays on Bentham. Oxford, 1982, 18.
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is no single provision that expresses the claim in this explicit form. The normative claim is 
constituted by the interplay between a number of statutory provisions and certain contextual 
features of the relevant piece of legislation: Equality Act 2010. The key provision is section 
13(1) of the Act that stipulates that ‘A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, 
because of a protected characteristic,23 A treats B less favourably than A treats or would 
treat others.’24 
It is also of some importance for my analysis that this is a norm that comes with an 
obvious rationale. Direct discrimination is to be prohibited because discriminatory practices 
are an affront to equality. The fi ght against discrimination is an aspect of the fi ght for 
equality in a democratic society.25 
I will not attempt to provide an exhaustive analysis of the statutory prohibition of 
direct discrimination.26 I focus on one aspect that I am particularly interested in. If we look 
closer, we see that our norm combines the features of constitutive and regulative rules.27 
(It is constitutive of what we mean by ‘direct discrimination’ in the context of legal 
procedures in the UK.) However, I will concentrate only on the way it operates as a 
regulative rule: the way it purports to guide action. When we look at the norm in its 
regulative function, what we already know about it outlines a distinctive conceptual 
structure: it makes reference to certain forms of action, normatively qualifi es them (as 
‘prohibited’ or ‘illegal’), and it establishes a justifi catory link between the normative 
qualifi cation and a background justifi cation. I set out to clarify, to some extent, how the 
interplay of these three elements constitutes normative guidance. 
I do not claim that I have revealed here a conceptual structure that can be found in all 
legal norms. (That would be pretty silly to claim: legal norms come in rich structural 
varieties.) But I believe that it is pretty ubiquitous in the legal systems of constitutional 
democracies, and that it is informative about the normativity of law.28
23 ‘Protected characteristics’ are listed in section 4 of Equality Act 2010: age, disability, gender 
reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion and belief, sex 
and sexual orientation.
24 On the face of it, this is actually a descriptive claim that explains what ‘direct discrimination’ 
means. But there can be no doubt that it is normatively qualifi ed as ‘prohibited’. Equality Act 2010 
contains a series of further provisions that make more explicit normative claims about the legality of 
discrimination – including direct discrimination. For example, s. 39(1) stipulates that ‘An employer 
(A) must not discriminate against a person (B) (…) in the arrangements A makes for deciding to 
whom to offer employment…’
25 This association with the ideal of equality is advertised in the very title of Equality Act 2010. 
Also, we read in §10 of the Explanatory Notes that ‘The Act has two main purposes – to harmonise 
discrimination law, and to strengthen the law to support progress on equality.’ Actually there is a 
particular vision of equality manifested here: predominantly formal equality as opposed to substantive 
equality, and equality of opportunity as opposed to equality of outcome. 
26 I admit that my characterisation of the norm is still not complete. Most importantly, I have 
not made it clear that direct discrimination is not prohibited in all areas of social life. UK anti-
discrimination law covers only services and public functions (Part 3), premises (Part 4), work (Part 5), 
education (Part 6) and associations (Part 7). But I hope that we already have a useful template for the 
analysis.
27 For the distinction, see Searle, J. R.: Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. 
Cambridge, 1969, 33.  
28 I acknowledge that it is more typical that norms are analysed in terms of operative facts and 
their normative consequences. See e.g. MacCormick: Institutions of Law. op. cit. 24–28. See also 
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For a good while in my analysis, I would like to forget that this norm is part of a 
particular legal system. (I will only provide a more detailed characterisation of it as a legal 
norm in Part II.) Here, I will look at it as a normative claim outside the boundaries of law. 
The prohibition of direct discrimination facilitates such an analysis pretty nicely. Only a 
few decades ago, it was still not part of the law in the UK.29 It is also important (and 
helpful) for my analysis that the underlying normative idea was not even a broadly accepted 
moral requirement from the outset. No doubt, some people passionately supported it, but 
others were ready to go with it reluctantly at best. Further others were uncomfortable with it 
(because they were worried about the implications for rearranging patterns of social 
interaction). And still further others rejected it as an aspect to and illegitimate form of social 
engineering by nosey liberals. It started off as a normative claim associated with a good 
deal of moral and political controversy.
What can we say about the ‘normative quality’ of the claim if it is made outside the 
boundaries of source-based law?30 We know that, even in the 1950s, one could say (and 
many did) quite meaningfully something like this: ‘Treating people less favourably just 
because they are of a different colour or gender is wrong: if we truly respect the moral 
equality of persons, we must stand up against discrimination.’ Was this claim capable of 
normative guidance?31
2.2. Practical reasons
Before we can answer this question, we need to start with developing a fi tting terminology. 
It will come with an abstract characterisation of normative guidance that is tailored to the 
purposes of my analysis. That will enable me to articulate better what I mean by normative 
guidance. We can start with a general interpretive claim about normative phenomena. Our 
language of normative phenomena (i.e. the language that we use to communicate what it 
means to act on an instruction or how we apportion blame for violations of normative 
requirements) suggests that normative guidance is not simply about getting people to do 
what others want them to do. The idea of compliance is constitutive of normative guidance. 
Guiding action is normative only when it becomes effective through compliance.32 
MacCormick, N.: Rhetoric and the Rule of Law. Oxford, 2005, 24–25. It is quite possible that the 
traditional way of analysing the structure of norms is superior to mine. But the structure I outline here 
works better for my investigation. 
29 The underlying normative idea (defi ning unlawful direct discrimination in terms of treating 
others less favourably on prohibited grounds) fi rst fi gured in s. 1 of Race Relations Act 1968. The 
particular wording of s. 13 of Equality Act 2010 can be traced back to s. 1 of Sex Discrimination Act 
1975.
30 On the concept of ‘source-based law’, see Raz: Ethics in the Public Domain. op. cit. 211.
31 I admit that the example I rely on is suspiciously convenient in an important respect. One can 
envisage it as either a legal or a moral claim without any signifi cant change in the way it is formulated. 
Of course, there are many legal norms that are not this similar to their moral counterparts. Some 
moral claims are profoundly reformulated when they become legal norms. E.g. I have a moral reason 
to contribute to the costs of public services but the law transforms it to an obligation to pay specifi c 
taxes. There are important questions one can raise about such ‘transformations’. I sought to set aside 
those issues here.    
32 It is for this reason that no one would characterise as an instance of normative guidance when 
someone is subjected to direct physical duress (e.g. when someone is tied to a seat and taken 
somewhere), or when someone’s unconscious state (like that of being intoxicated) is manipulated to 
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My account of normative guidance is meant to be a way of unpacking the implications 
of the constitutive relationship between normative claims, guidance and compliance. The 
organising idea is that normative guidance (in itself) does not force or even compel anyone 
to act upon it – at least in the sense of excluding alternative courses of action.33 The act by 
the addressee remains, so to say, voluntary.34 She still controls her own behaviour when 
accepting normative guidance. It remains a matter choice for the addressee whether she 
complies. 
One way to explain the impact of normative claims on human action is to say that 
normative guidance interferes with the way intentions are formed. This is what legal 
theorists normally do,35 and I go along with the orthodoxy. It is of central importance for 
my analysis that this ‘interference’ takes place in the discursive dimension of human action: 
it is normative claims that make some impact. Normative guidance manages to infl uence 
the agent’s intentions mainly by way of altering the ‘discursive parameters’ of her own 
perception of the pertinent action problems. By defi nition, nothing becomes a factor in 
normative guidance that cannot play a role in intersubjective practical discourses or, more 
specifi cally, deliberative processes targeted at human action. Normative guidance is a 
communicative process: what is normative can always be a matter of expression and 
discussion.36 
I will keep in focus the conceptual links between normative guidance, normative 
claims, discursive processes and intentions by relying on a particular terminological 
framework: that of the theory of practical reasons.37 My ambitions in this analysis could be 
understood as targeted at clarifying the types of reasons that have a constitutive role in 
generating normative guidance.  
I construe practical reasons as thoroughly discursive phenomena. By practical reasons, 
I mean discursive constructions designed to address action problems. (That should not 
come as a surprise: in an interpretive framework, it is diffi cult to imagine any other way to 
go about conceiving of them.38) This implies that there is no normative guidance without 
the constitutive role of practical reasons. Efforts to infl uence behaviour are not instances of 
normative guidance unless they can be analysed in terms of providing practical reasons.
achieve a certain outcome. In such cases, the role of compliance is neutralised in a way that makes it 
impossible to talk of normative guidance. Indirect duress (that is, coercion), e.g. when someone is 
made to do something due to threats, is a more complicated case. I talk about it in detail below.
33 This is a surprisingly underappreciated aspect of normativity in legal theory. The law operates 
by using, as opposed to suppressing, the agency of humans. See Waldron, J.: The Concept and the 
Rule of Law. Georgia Law Review, 43 (2008), 1–61, 26. 
34 On the sense of ‘voluntary action’, relevant here, see Anscombe, G. E. M.: Intention. Oxford, 
1957, 33–34. 
35 See e.g. MacCormick: Institutions of Law. op. cit. 103. 
36 This is a refl ection of John Searle’s principle of ‘expressibility’: ‘whatever can be meant can 
be said.’ See his Speech Acts… op. cit. 19.
37 The way I use the concept of ‘practical reason’ relies heavily on Joseph Raz’s theory. See 
Raz, J.: Practical Reason and Norms. 2nd ed. Princeton, 1990, 15–22. But the peculiarities of my 
approach warrant a series of deviations and adjustments that I do not keep track of. 
38 It is possible that the most obvious alternative route (that seeks to reduce reasons to 
psychological phenomena like ‘conviction’ and ‘desire’) is philosophically implausible. See e.g. 
Stoutland, F.: The Real Reasons. In: Bransen, J.–Cuypers, S. E. (eds): Human Action, Deliberation 
and Causation. Dordrecht, 1998, 43–44. By I do not pursue that issue here.
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Due to certain features of my account (that will become gradually clearer below), I 
need to link this idea of practical reasons quite intimately to a couple of considerations 
about practical justifi cation. I believe that, if we characterise reasons as discursive 
phenomena, we can usefully clarify them by revealing the ‘job’ they do in communicative 
processes associated with practical justifi cation. Practical reasons have a distinctive (and 
character-determining) role in the discursive process of justifying action to others and 
ourselves.39 As a result, the justifi cation of action can always be represented in the following 
form: ‘I believe that φ-ing is justifi ed because…’ Whatever comes after the ‘because’ in a 
meaningful way, regardless of any further categorical specifi cation, qualifi es as a practical 
reason.40
Of course, I do not try to tackle here the complex issue of what ‘justifi cation’ is. But I 
cannot avoid highlighting two considerations that have far-reaching implications for my 
approach. (Below, I will add further clarifi cations that make my account slightly more 
specifi c.) First, practical justifi cation aims at depicting the action as both intelligible and 
reasonably acceptable41 – under the given circumstances, from the affected agents’ point of 
view. One can say that justifi cation aims at merging the perspectives of the claimants and 
the addressee to facilitate the development of mutually acceptable judgments on the 
pertinent action problems. The constitutive role of the affected agents’ point of view implies 
that the subjects and the addressees of justifi cation can only be rational beings. 
Secondly, justifi cation is a defensive process.42 It becomes necessary when objections 
are raised about a course of action, or if the agent is aware that her behaviour is vulnerable 
to possible objections. The need for practical justifi cation arises when the agent (or someone 
else who cares about the way the pertinent action is assessed) perceives these objections as 
challenges that warrant a response.43 The importance of this consideration lies in the fact 
that, if added to the fi rst one, it implies that justifi cation is necessarily a relational concept. 
We can make sense of it only in specifi ed discursive contexts structured by interpersonal 
relations. Justifi cation is thoroughly communicative. More exactly, the conditions of success 
for practical justifi cation in light of normative claims are thoroughly determined by the 
constitutive rules of the discourses that provide their communicative context. 
2.3. Direct normativity and the role of expectations
Now that we have a terminological focus, we can make the idea of normative guidance a bit 
more specifi c for the purposes of this analysis. The very idea of normative guidance does 
not imply that the practical reasons that happen to shape the agent’s intentions are always 
39 As I believe that justifying in front of others has a sort of analytical priority, I set aside issues 
concerning justifying to ourselves.
40 Cf. Ricoeur, P.: Practical Reason. In: Ricoeur, P.: From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics 
II. London, 1991, 189. For a more comprehensive, but similarly functional, clarifi cation of the concept 
of ‘reason’, see Davidson, D.: Actions, Reasons, and Causes. In: Davidson: Essays on Actions and 
Events. Oxford, 1980, 3–4.
41 The role of practical reasons in my account is predicated on an inherent connection between 
‘sensitivity to reasons’ and reasonableness. Cf. Raz, J.: Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and 
Action. Oxford, 1999, 19–20. 
42 Cf. Simmons, A. J.: Justifi cation and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations. 
Cambridge, 2001, 124.
43 My views on practical justifi cation rely on Carl Wellman’s model of ‘challenge and response’. 
See his Challenge and Response: Justifi cation in Ethics. Carbondale and Edwardsville (Ill.), 1971.
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deliberately provided by others. The interpretive data I work with, however, all originate 
from social practices in which making normative claims with a view to having an impact on 
the behaviour of certain others plays a constitutive role. (That is why I tend to call the 
subjects of normative guidance ‘addressees’.) What my analysis revolves around is actually 
a particular mode of normativity that we could call ‘direct’ normativity. Direct normativity 
is built on the social relations of actual persons, and is manifested in the practice of making 
normative claims (e.g. when someone gives instructions to others, when a recognised 
authority makes rules for a class of addressees, and even when someone seeks to make an 
impact on others by judging their behaviour). 
I concentrate my attention specifi cally on direct normativity because this is what we 
need to get closer to the legal theoretical implications of the analysis (that will be revealed 
in Part II). I assume that the law, in its entirety, functions within the framework of the 
intersubjective practice of reason-giving: legal norms never arise without human actions 
consciously targeted at creating them. One way to express this idea is that I will try to 
capture the normativity of law within the boundaries of a ‘social constitutional model’.44 
Quite obviously, the emphasis on direct normativity puts the concept of ‘normative 
claim’ at the centre of my analysis.45 I speak of normative claims when particular agents, 
with the specifi c intention of infl uencing behaviour, form and express expectations on the 
way other people should behave (or the way their actions should be assessed). 
The character-defi ning element in this defi nition is the constitutive role of 
‘expectations’.46 I have indicated above that normative guidance in itself does not force or 
even compel anyone to act upon it. Without further specifi cation, this may give the 
impression that I claim that normative claims guide action solely through the intellectual or 
emotional force of practical reasons that substantively justify a given course of human 
action. But that would be a false impression. It seems to me that guidance through normative 
claims actually combines the rational appeal of substantive practical justifi cations with the 
practical weight of other people’s expectations. Normative claims are not mere expressions 
of expectations concerning other people’s behaviour.47 (They are not mere ‘must-demands’ 
44 Cf. Postema, G. J.: On the Universality of Moral Justifi cation. In: Friedman, M. et al. (eds): 
Rights and Reason: Essays in Honor of Carl Wellman. Dordrecht, 2000, 93–94. In a sense, this 
justifi es the positivists’ insistence that the law is a ‘social artefact’. See e.g. Mitrophanous, E.: Soft 
Positivism. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 17 (1997), 621–641, 622.   
45 I note here that my characterisation drastically simplifi es direct normativity in an important 
respect. A more complete account would also operate with the concept of ‘normative statements’: the 
propositional expressions of normative claims. Only claims that can be expressed as normative 
statements (as utterances in the context of specifi c discourses) qualify as normative claims. The 
distinction between normative claims and statements would be needed to account for detached 
attitudes to normative claims which play a crucial role in complex normative practices. 
46 This feature of my account is primarily inspired by the distinction Niklas Luhmann draws 
between ‘cognitive’ and ‘normative expectations’. See e.g. his Social Systems. Stanford, 1995, 330–
332. Luhmann, N.: Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal 
System. Cardozo Law Review, 13 (1992), 1419–1441, 1426–1427. For another theoretical inspiration, 
see Llewellyn, K. N.: The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method. 
Yale Law Journal, 49 (1940), 1355–1400, 1368.
47 This is what distinguishes my account from imperative theories of law, despite the reliance on 
the concept of ‘expectation’. 
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or imperations.48) That is why normative claims are not generated without establishing 
some (at least, implicit) link with practical reasons justifying the normative qualifi cation of 
the relevant forms of action. But the fact that the normative claims represent expectations is 
no less signifi cant.49 When the addressee ponders the force of normative claims, she has to 
fi gure out the practical weight of the expectations they represent. By communicating 
expectations, normative claims bring into focus the addressee’s relationships with relevant 
others. 
This internal complexity of the action-guiding capacity of normative claims helps 
explain better how normative guidance is related to practical justifi cation. Once again, we 
should remember that normative claims do not compel us directly to do what others tell us. 
Their primary job is to point to courses of action that can be regarded as more justifi able 
than others (or less justifi able than others) in light of reasons that relevant others fi nd 
signifi cant. Normative claims have a capacity to guide only if it somehow matters to the 
addressee that she does not subvert those expectations. It is also of crucial importance that 
justifying action in light of (direct) normative claims is slightly more specifi c than practical 
justifi cation in general. The expectations that are manifested in the normative claims 
determine the discursive context for justifi cation. If it matters to the addressee whether she 
subverts the pertinent expectations, the justifi cation will have to rely on reasons that are 
recognised by the relevant others. (If it does not matter, the need to justify to them does not 
even arise.) The fact that the normative claim establishes a link between courses of action 
and practical reasons is as important (and informative) to the addressee as the fact that it 
purports to tell us what to do. The normative claim always implies an indication to the 
addressee of the reasons that relevant others will fi nd particularly relevant for the 
justifi catory assessment of her actions.
3. Normative claims and practical reasons
3.1. The action guiding capacity of normative claims
I have mentioned above that the normative claim we have set out to analyse (‘treating 
people less favourably just because they are of a different colour or gender is wrong: if we 
truly respect the moral equality of persons, we must stand up against discrimination’) has 
three structural elements: (1) making reference to a form of action;50 (2) subjecting the 
action to normative qualifi cation; and (3) invoking practical reasons in support of the 
normative qualifi cation. We can subject them now to a more profound analysis.
There are two relations between these structural elements that are constitutive of the 
normative character of the claim in question. The fi rst is the interplay between the normative 
48 I take the notion of ‘must-demands’ from Matthew Kramer. See his In Defense of Legal 
Positivism: Law without Trimmings. Oxford, 1999, 84. For the concept of ‘imperations’, see Hare, R. 
M.: Sorting Out Ethics. Oxford, 1997, 11–12.
49 I use the term ‘expectation’ in a somewhat loose sense, mainly because I want to keep it 
compatible with what I say about the law below. When I say that normative claims represent 
expectations, I mean that there are others who care whether we act upon them or not. They are likely 
to criticise us, or even take actions against us, if we do not comply.
50 What I mean here is reference in a broad sense (cf. Searle: Speech Acts… op. cit. 26–27). It 
specifi es what the normative claim is about – in terms of action, agent, temporal and geographical 
scope, limiting circumstances, etc.
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qualifi cation and the addressed form of action. The way they are related to one another 
indicates what to do (‘direct discrimination is to be avoided’). At the same time, it represents 
the expectations on the addressees’ conduct (‘we expect people not to discriminate, and we 
will criticise those who do’). The second connection is between the normative qualifi cation 
and the invoked practical reasons. This is what distinguishes the normative claim from a 
mere must-demand. It is this connection that generates the normative claim’s substantive 
justifi catory force. It helps understand why one might think that direct discrimination is 
wrong, and warrants criticism (‘direct discrimination is wrong because it is an affront to 
status equality’).
3.2. The success of normative claims
Of course, this is far from adequate as it stands.51 We have to dig a bit deeper to fi gure out 
the capacity of normative claims to provide normative guidance. I sought to facilitate this 
investigation by my terminological choices. One of the reasons for talking only about 
normative ‘claims’ in this context (and not, say, ‘norms’) is that I want to emphasise that 
there may be utterances that attempt but fail to provide normative guidance. They remain 
mere claims – they remain ‘unsuccessful’.52 
What are the conditions of ‘success’ for a normative claim? First, it is important to see 
that, by ‘success’, I do not mean the ability to generate compliance. That is a conceptually 
different issue: the issue of the ‘effi cacy’ of normative claims in my terminology.53 (And I 
will talk about it in some detail below.) In my account, ‘success’ refers to the ability of the 
normative claim to gain justifi catory force in relation to the addressee’s conduct. The 
normative claim is successful if it alters the conditions of justifi ability for the addressee’s 
behaviour in the context of specifi ed human relations.54 It provides the background to a 
competent critical appraisal of the addressee’s behaviour.55 The other side of this insight is 
that successful normative claims are able to justify the addressee in acting upon the 
expectation of others in the given circumstances – even if it means overriding her own 
preferences.56
51 There is a further complication about the relationship between normative claims and practical 
reasons that I set aside here. Normative claims can function as reasons themselves. (People are 
unlikely to be surprised if I say that the relevant piece of legislation is the reason for paying my 
income tax.) A normative claim (if successful) can function as a reason in itself, and can be used to 
establish further normative claims. I leave open this possibility with some reluctance: there are 
attractive theoretical advantages to treating normative claims as discursive constructions that channel 
reasons through discursive processes but that are not reasons themselves. But I simply do not have 
interpretive data at my disposal that would justify my theoretical preference.
52 The choice of terminology here is inspired by John Searle. See Speech Acts… op. cit. 54 
(conditions for ‘successful and non-defective performance’) and 94 (‘unsuccessful’ acts).
53 I use Kelsenian terminology at this point. See e.g. Kelsen: Introduction to the Problems of 
Legal Theory. op. cit. 28–29.
54 To avoid misunderstanding, I emphasise that changing the conditions of justifi ability is not 
the same as providing conclusive reasons. What is needed for the success of the normative claim is 
making a difference to justifi ability. It may be enough that the normative claim manages to add a 
consideration that one’s deliberation about justifi ability must account for. 
55 Cf. Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 57. 
56 Some might object that, right up to this point, I have failed to clarify what I mean by ‘norms’. 
But it is only at this point that I can provide that clarifi cation. In my account, norms are simply 
successful normative claims. 
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Keeping the conditions of success and the ability of generating compliance apart is a 
key conceptual point in my account. Without maintaining that distinction, we would not be 
able adequately to characterise situations in which someone rightly criticises others for not 
complying with a certain normative standard. (The criticism would not be appropriate if it 
could not be based on a successful normative claim.) 
How do the conditions of success look like for a normative claim? If we look back 
upon the structural features of our normative claim about direct discrimination, we soon 
realise that one can call into question its ability to change the conditions of justifi ability for 
the addressee in two fundamental ways. One can doubt that it has managed to establish a 
justifi catory connection between the normative qualifi cation and relevant practical reasons 
(i.e. one can doubt that there are good substantive reasons not to discriminate). Alternatively, 
one can deny that those who make the normative claim are competent to set standards for 
the addressees. Their expectations do not matter to the addressees in terms of the 
justifi ability of their behaviour. A normative claim is successful if it resists these two 
challenges. 
I think we can capture these considerations by the claim that there are two types of 
practical reasons that must come together to constitute a successful normative claim. (1) 
There must be reasons providing a substantive justifi catory background to the way given 
forms of action are normatively qualifi ed in the normative claim. (2) There must also be 
reasons that underlie the competence of those who make the given normative claim. 
I believe that the fi rst aspect to the conditions of success is well understood and very 
well analysed in the literature.57 The second aspect (‘competence’) deserves more attention 
here. And we can start off from the fact that, in our actions, we continuously rely on the 
insight that normative claims owe their characteristic force partly to the normative position 
of those who formulate them. The same normative claim will have a very different impact 
on someone’s behaviour if it is made by her father, child, boss, spiritual leader, neighbour 
or a complete stranger on the street. We also know that this ‘differential’ impact is not 
simply due to the fact that normative claims formulated by a knowledgeable agent tend to 
have more weight than claims by an obviously incompetent one. It is far more important 
that the practical weight of normative claims is inherently linked to the normative 
signifi cance of the social position of those who formulate them.58 Only fathers and mothers 
can give parental advice to their children, only judges can make judicial decisions, and only 
the acting managers can rearrange the work-related responsibilities of the employees. 
Actually, it is easier to keep this consideration in focus if normative claims are construed as 
specifi c expectations. Expectations on one’s action are always formed in a normatively 
prefi gured social environment. Normative claims cannot provide normative guidance if they 
are not adjusted to the normative features of the relevant human relations. Normative claims 
presuppose a normatively relevant relationship between the claimant and the addressee.
57 Frederick Schauer has provided a profound analysis of how rules are conceptually linked 
with their ‘rationale’, ‘justifi cation’ or even ‘generating justifi cation’. See his Playing by the Rules. 
Oxford, 1991, 5, 26, 53 and 74. My characterisation seeks to remain compatible with Schauer’s claims 
when it comes to identifying the conditions of success for normative claims.   
58 In a similar context, Andrei Marmor speaks about ‘identity related’ reasons (where the 
addressee’s reason to φ partly depends on the identity of another agent who suggests, requests, or 
orders the addressee to φ). See his Philosophy of Law. Princeton, 2011, 62. My competence criterion 
implies that direct normativity is always reliant on identity related reasons. 
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3.3. The problem of coercion
One of the reasons why considerations about the conditions of success are conceptually 
important here is that they allow for a qualifi cation without which the present analysis could 
not be plausible. Accounts of normative guidance have to reckon with the mode of guiding 
behaviour exemplifi ed by coercion. What we have to think of is not direct physical duress 
where the intention of the agent is made irrelevant (e.g. someone is chained to a seat and 
taken somewhere). What I am talking about could be characterised as ‘indirect duress’. It 
occurs when others create a situation in which the addressee adjusts her intentions as a 
response to the pressure deliberately applied to her. The addressee herself decides to act 
against her original or preferred intentions. The textbook cases of this kind of ‘guidance’ 
are well known: someone is forced by a gunman, scared into submission, blackmailed with 
a piece of sensitive information, etc.  The confusing aspect of coercion here is that, in many 
respects, it meets the criteria we have set for the success of normative claims. We can 
defi nitely say that the actions of those who ‘coerce’ are sources of reasons for the addressee, 
and that they alter the conditions of justifi ability for the addressee’s own behaviour. (It may 
be that, an hour ago, I was justifi ed in my intention to go to work but, now that someone 
holds me at gunpoint, it is no longer reasonable to persist with my original plan.)
No doubt, there are important overlaps between mere coercion and successful 
normative claims but it would be profoundly implausible to depict mere coercion as an 
example of normative guidance.59 I hope that we can avoid the implausibility here by 
relying on what has been said about the ‘condition of competence’ for successful normative 
claims. Mere coercion does not meet that condition – even if it has the capacity to give 
reasons to act in a certain way. Coercion does not constitute normative guidance when it 
lacks plausible justifi cation in the dimension of competence.60 It is not an instance of 
successful normative claims.61 
Of course, the relationship between normative guidance and coercion is not without 
further complications. Coercion and normative guidance are not simply opposed to one 
another. There are cases of coercion that fall within the realm of normative guidance. There 
are agents whose normative competence extends to the capacity to add extra practical 
weight to their normative claims by resorting to some form of coercion. Most importantly 
for us, there are authorities who are entitled to threaten addressees with punishment. It is 
true of the public attorney who can prosecute a suspected criminal, the judge who can send 
a defendant to jail, the offi cial who can impose a fi ne, the teacher who can fail a student, 
and the parent who can discipline a disobeying child. But the cases of ‘justifi ed coercion’ 
should not subvert the conceptual relations here. It seems clear enough that, in the cases of 
justifi ed coercion, it is never the coercive act itself that makes the guidance of action 
59 See Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 19.
60 One could characterise the relationship between normative claims and illegitimate coercion 
more accurately. I set aside a number of fi ner points here. E.g. we can say that successful normative 
claims establish a justifi ed demand on the addressee. This is an element that is missing when someone, 
without authorisation, forces others to do something. The victims of illegitimate coercion must do 
what they are asked to do but not because they owe it. Cf. Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 19–24 
and 27. 
61 I do not mean that illegitimate coercion does not constitute practical guidance. On the 
contrary, mere physical threats are very good at guiding action. But it is not normative guidance. 
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normative.62 In fact, the imposition of coercion is justifi ed only because it enjoys 
justifi catory support from normative claims that are successful quite independently of the 
capacity to coerce. Justifi ed coercion is always parasitic on successful normative claims.     
3.4. Success, effi cacy and the idea of normative guidance
Above, I have introduced the conditions of success for normative claims by contrasting 
them with the conditions of effi cacy (that is, the ability to generate compliance). I have 
claimed that a successful normative claim does not need to be effi cacious in generating 
compliance for each addressee, at all times. (This is the conceptual precondition for 
criticising addressees for not complying with a normative claim.) 
But does this mean that, for a normative claim, the ability to provide normative 
guidance is simply a matter of meeting the conditions of success? Well, that that would be 
counter-intuitive at best. It would run contrary to conceptual claims I have made earlier. I 
have identifi ed at least one mode of guidance that is not normative (i.e. mere coercion). 
That turns normative guidance into a subcategory of ‘guidance’ (or ‘practical guidance’, to 
be more accurate). And that broader category of guidance must be, at least partly, a matter 
of effi cacy: getting people to do what others expect them to do. Also, I have claimed above 
that the idea of compliance is constitutive of normative guidance. These conceptual links 
would be broken if we accepted the possibility of instances of normative guidance that do 
not in fact guide anyone. Too much of my analysis would be undermined without admitting 
that a measure of effi cacy for normative claims is also constitutive of the concept of 
normative guidance.
It suggests that normative guidance can be broken down to two aspects: (1) changing 
the conditions of justifi ability for the addressees; and (2) the capacity to generate 
compliance. Without the second aspect, the normative claim does not guide, and without 
the fi rst, the guidance is not normative. The idea of normative guidance implies that there is 
a (systematic) impact on what people do, and that this impact is driven by successful 
normative claims. 
3.5. The ability to generate compliance
There is a need to provide further clarifi cation of the conditions for effi cacy for a normative 
claim (for its ability to generate compliance). More specifi cally, I will ask how normative 
claims can generate reasons for the addressees that facilitate compliance. At fi rst, it might 
seem like an unnecessary repetition of a point discussed above. I have claimed that practical 
reasons are part of the basic structure of normative claims: certain types of them are 
conditions of their success. However, we should not forget that success and effi cacy are two 
different (though related) aspects of normative claims. It should not be assumed that there is 
a conceptual guarantee that the role of reasons in generating successful normative claims 
will not be signifi cantly different from the role of reasons in facilitating compliance by 
particular addressees. A plausible account of normativity needs to accommodate the 
possibility that the addressees comply with a normative claim for reasons that are different 
to the reasons that make the claim itself successful. Normative claims exploit the dynamics 
of human relations in a broad variety of ways. 
62 Cf. MacCormick: Institutions of Law. op. cit. 108.
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We can appreciate the signifi cance of this distinction a lot better if we realise an 
important contextual difference between reasons that make the normative claim successful 
and the reasons that facilitate compliance. The reasons that we can associate with the 
conditions of success are specifi ed for the justifi catory needs of the normative claim. As I 
have said above, they must open up a perspective that is common to the claimants and the 
addressees: they are there to facilitate mutually acceptable judgments on the pertinent action 
problems. Quite obviously, this perspective plays no necessary or constitutive role in the 
reasons that facilitate compliance. Compliance should make sense from the addressee’s 
individual perspective – it must be a good idea to them to choose to comply in the given 
circumstances (even when it is burdensome or even painful).  
This point becomes clearer as soon as we realise that the mere fact of compliance does 
not tell us much about the reasons that actually facilitated it. Different addressees have 
different practical outlooks, and effi cient guidance of action is only possible if the relevant 
normative claims are capable of fi tting into different practical outlooks. The conceptual 
possibility of generating a variety of different reasons for compliance is built into each 
normative claim. It is one of their conceptual characteristics.  
It does not mean that reasons for compliance can become unrelated to the reasons that 
constitute the success of the pertinent normative claim. (That would erroneously equate 
compliance with mere conformity.) Normative guidance presupposes that it is due, at least 
partly, to the normative claim that the addressee acts in a particular way. It seems to me that 
the reasons for compliance must remain related, in particular, to the conditions of 
competence for the normative claim. The expectations of important others must be 
constitutive of the specifi c practical signifi cance of the normative claim for the addressees. 
It seems far less plausible to claim that the background justifi cation to the normative claim 
has a necessary role to play in reasons for compliance. In fact, when the background 
justifi cation takes centre stage, it is not obvious whether the normative claim has managed 
to guide the action at all.63 We should not forget that the practical signifi cance of the 
background justifi cation is independent of the normative claim. (Otherwise, it could not 
justify it.) That is why it seems plausible to me that the practical difference that the 
normative claim makes (in terms of compliance) must derive primarily from the expectations 
it represents. So, the question about reasons for compliance boils down to fi guring out how 
the expectations of relevant others can matter to the addressee, and how to capture that in 
terms of reasons.   
We can usefully test the plausibility of this claim by outlining three different ‘scenarios’ 
of compliance that are eminently meaningful to any addressee with normal social skills. 
(I formulate all these scenarios in terms of the practical weight of the expectations 
represented by the relevant normative claims.) 
63 This obviously resonates with what certain positivists (and Scott Shapiro in particular) say on 
the so-called ‘practical difference thesis’. The thesis captures the insight that, if the reasons that 
constitute the rationale of a normative claim guide directly, the normative claim itself becomes 
redundant. Hence, if laws are to make a difference to their addressees’ conduct, they cannot guide 
simply through the rational appeal of underlying reasons. See Shapiro, S. J.: The Difference That 
Rules Make. In: Brian, B. (ed.): Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory. Oxford, 1998. Shapiro, 
S. J.: On Hart’s Way Out. In: Jules Coleman (ed.): Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the 
Concept of Law. Oxford, 2001, 178–179. See also Coleman: The Practice of Principle. op. cit. 69. I 
believe we do justice to the plausible insight here by emphasising that the action-guiding capacity of 
normative claims is inherently dependent on the fact that they manifest expectations. 
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(1) For one, faced with a normative claim, the addressee might think that the need to 
comply follows from her own moral commitments, as well as the moral character of her 
relationship with those who formulated the expectations. By not acting on their expectations, 
the addressee would make a moral mistake – making her action blatantly unjustifi able. 
There are relevant others to whom compliance with the given normative claim is owed. The 
addressee would fail relevant others by not complying: she would invite a criticism that 
even she would be forced to accept as justifi ed.  
(2) The addressee might also think that the moral weight of the expectations manifested 
in the normative claim is irrelevant. However, she may take more seriously the prospect 
that ignoring the expectations on her behaviour can make it more diffi cult to cooperate with 
the relevant others. (They would no longer be inclined to employ her, to do business with 
her, to play with her, to keep her in the loop, to extend certain benefi ts to her, etc.) If the 
continued cooperation, the maintenance of social relations is important to the addressee, it 
would be silly not to act upon the expectations that were important enough for them to be 
formulated as normative requirements. Compliance often comes with attractive benefi ts 
addressees are sensitive to.
(3) Apart from being unmoved by the moral aspect of the normative claim, the 
addressee might also be indifferent to the prospective benefi ts of cooperating with those 
who have expectations on her behaviour. Nevertheless, she might be sensitive to the fact 
that they have enough power or social infl uence to force her to take their expectations 
seriously. She does not want to fi nd herself in open, and potentially perilous, confl ict with 
them. Meeting their expectations may be burdensome but its costs are dwarfed by the 
possible losses the addressee can suffer if they turn their power against her. If she does not 
want to suffer unreasonable losses, she would be stupid to ignore their expectations.
Of course, by outlining these three scenarios, I do not seek to capture all the possible 
ways in which one can fi nd reasons to act upon normative expectations. There may be 
innumerable other ways as well – some of them are more complicated or even more exotic. 
(Someone may comply out of blind habit, in unrefl ective deference to a tradition, or with a 
view to manipulating certain human relations.) But these three scenarios are more 
fundamental than others exactly because, as I have said above, they are eminently 
meaningful to anyone with normal social skills. We constantly read other people’s behaviour 
in light of the motivations that are at work here, and rely on them in our efforts to infl uence 
other people’s behaviour.64 They are deeply ingrained in our social practices, and determine 
how we design them. 
These considerations will have a crucial role in characterising the normativity of law 
in Part II. For that reason, we need to fi nd a proper terminological focus for them. We can 
try to characterise more accurately the types of reasons that make these three ‘scenarios’ 
possible. 
I organise this further clarifi cation around the simple (and rather under-refl ected) idea 
that everybody has aims that are constitutive of her practical orientations, and often even 
64 A more complete analysis of normative guidance and the ability of normative claims to 
generate compliance would need to account for the relationship between practical reasons and the 
empirical psychological factors that actually guide behaviour: motives. By defi nition, the agent 
performs an action only if she is motivated accordingly. For a revealing account of the conceptual 
relation, see Grice, G. R.: Motive and Reason. In: Joseph, R. (ed.): Practical Reasoning. Oxford, 
1978. See also Anscombe: Intention. op. cit. 17–18.  
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her identity. People are sensitive to practical reasons that touch upon such ‘personal aims’.65 
Of course, the relationship between personal aims and practical reasons is complex. What I 
need here is just one insight about that relationship: we need to take a distinction between 
two fundamental ways in which they can be related to one another. On the one hand, the 
practical weight of certain reasons may be fully reducible to personal aims: they have a 
justifi catory force because acting on them makes sense in light of one’s personal aims. In an 
important sense, such reasons have action-guiding capacity that is instrumental to one’s 
given personal aims. We can call them instrumental reasons. (They can also be termed 
prudential reasons.) On the other hand, there are reasons whose practical weight is not (or 
not wholly) determined by personal aims. They are inherently associated with values that 
form part of one’s identity: they are constitutive of one’s personal aims. They cannot be 
fully reduced to personal aims; on the contrary, one’s personal aims can be (at least partly) 
reduced to them. Such reasons are non-instrumental. We act upon non-instrumental reasons 
not because it promises some benefi t or fends off harms but because it would be 
uncharacteristic of us not to act upon them. We would not look ourselves. 
If we inquire further, we see that instrumental reasons can be associated with one’s 
personal aims in two basic ways. One is when, so to say, the reasons run parallel with 
personal aims: acting on them promises to promote those aims (to facilitate their realisation). 
This is what we saw in action in scenario (2). If we want to give a name to this mechanism, 
we can say that normative claims can provide ‘benefi t reasons’.
The other characteristic way of providing instrumental reasons is based on creating 
situations in which the addressee sees her personal aims threatened. When the addressee 
faces the prospect of her aims being frustrated, she is bound to perceive the normative 
claims as strong prudential reasons. She will be motivated to comply to avoid the 
materialisation of the threats. This is compliance as characterised in scenario (3) above. The 
mechanism of coercion, that we have analysed in a previous subsection, also exemplifi es 
this possibility. We can say that, when the normative claims become effi cacious this way, 
compliance is a sort of response to pressure. I will call the reasons that generate this mode 
of compliance ‘response reasons’.66
I believe that the way instrumental reasons are related to compliance is relatively 
straightforward. The pattern of the relationship between personal aims and non-instrumental 
reasons raises trickier issues. The way it was refl ected in the fi rst scenario of compliance 
above makes it quite obvious that the non-instrumental reasons we are talking about here 
are very much likely to take the form of moral reasons.67 (In fact, I struggle to fi nd instances 
of non-instrumental reasons that we would not characterise as moral reasons.) But we have 
65 The idea that we can characterise the impact of normative claims on the addressees in terms 
of ‘aims’ they pursue is borrowed from Hart. See his: Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy. op. 
cit. 113. It is not an accident that I do not talk here of ‘individual aims’. One can identify oneself with 
collective aims which then become personal (although not individual) aims.
66 The distinction I draw between ‘benefi t reasons’ and ‘response reasons’ is inspired by Gerald 
Postema. He talks about ‘compliance reasons’ and ‘response reasons’ See Postema: Jurisprudence as 
Practical Philosophy. op. cit. 346–348. Due to the way I conceptualise ‘compliance’ here, I needed to 
deviate from Postema’s analysis, and adjust the terminology. 
67 Some scholars argue that the contrast between moral and prudential reasons is dubious. See 
e.g. Perry, M. J.: The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries. New York–Oxford, 31. I have derived 
the distinction from the contrast between instrumental and non-instrumental reasons in anticipation of 
objections like those raised by Perry. 
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to be more specifi c. The reasons that provide non-instrumental reasons for compliance are 
not just any kind of moral reasons. They must be reasons that make it a good idea to comply 
from the addressee’s individual perspective. They must be tailored to the addressee’s 
identity. In an important sense, they must be ‘identity-related’ reasons.68 They must be 
inherently linked to the importance for the addressee to stay true to herself, and not to fail 
important others. 
We also have to be more specifi c about the sense in which the law generates moral 
reasons for compliance. It is not that a normative claim must be seen as seeking to change 
one’s moral outlook. (That is the kind of practical impact that a normative claim is unlikely 
to achieve in itself.) What a normative claim can achieve is establishing a specifi c 
responsibility for compliance that is in line with the addressee’s own moral outlook. It can 
be attained by making it clear that there are others for whom the normative claim is 
important, and who rely on the addressee for her compliance. If those are important others 
with whom the addressee has a morally relevant relationship (and if compliance fi ts the 
parameters of their relationship), the expectations (that the normative claim comes to 
represent) take on specifi c moral signifi cance.69 It becomes a matter of moral responsibility 
for the addressee not to fail the relevant others. A normative tie is created between the 
addressee and the relevant others that can only be captured in terms of moral reasons.   
3.6. The action-guiding capacity of the condemnation of direct discrimination
It is time to return to our example of the normative claim condemning direct discrimination 
(‘treating people less favourably just because they are of a different colour or gender is 
wrong: if we truly respect the moral equality of persons, we must stand up against 
discrimination’). We can answer now the question whether it was capable of normative 
guidance before it was written into law. 
My account of normativity ended up characterising normative guidance in terms of 
fi ve types of reasons. Reasons arising from a background justifi cation and reasons for taking 
seriously the expectations it represents can make a normative claim successful. And its 
ability to generate moral, benefi t and response reasons enables it to attract some level of 
compliance. If these are the criteria, we can safely say that the condemnation of direct 
discrimination was a successful normative claim well before it was made part of statutory 
law – for at least a section of British society. For those who were committed participants of 
the liberal moral and political discourses (in which the normative claim was formulated in 
the fi rst place), it changed the conditions of justifi ability for their conduct. They were also 
68 Cf. Marmor: Philosophy of Law. op. cit. 62. I signifi cantly extend the concept of ‘identity-
related reason’ compared to Marmor’s analysis.
69 I note that the type of moral reason I try to articulate here is not without legal doctrinal 
relevance. E.g. it is known to play a role in debates over ‘prisoner disenfranchisement.’ In such cases, 
governments tend to argue (among others) that criminals have failed the democratic community by 
committing crimes, and that is the reason why it is fair to strip them of the right to vote (the argument 
from ‘civic responsibility’). For judicial assessments of the argument, see Sauvé v Attorney General 
of Canada (No.2) [2000] 2 C.F., Hirst v United Kingdom (No.2) [2006] 42 EHRR 41. The courts 
typically accept this argument as legitimate (see Hirst §§74–75), although it can be outweighed by 
other considerations (as it happened in both Hirst and Sauvé). The plausibility of the argument 
presupposes that, apart from the threat of punishment, citizens have a specifi c moral reason to comply 
with the law.  
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unlikely to call into the question the normative competence of those made claims about the 
unacceptability of direct discrimination. The normative claim was also capable of generating 
a measure of compliance. Those who supported the fi ght against discrimination on moral 
grounds were motivated not to discriminate. Some others were motivated to comply because 
they wanted to remain on good terms with those who were passionate about this issue. And 
further others might have wanted to avoid the wrath of political campaigners (e.g. negative 
publicity or a boycott on their businesses). 
Of course, this may have left out large swathes of the population (perhaps the majority 
of it) who did not comply and were not motivated to comply. But we can say that, within 
the bounds of particular moral and political discourses, the condemnation of direct 
discrimination was a successful normative claim well before it was written into law. 
Whatever legal institutionalisation did to it, it did not include creating a claim capable of 
normative guidance. Guidance by the normative claim was reconstituted, rather than 
constituted, in the process of turning it into a statutory obligation.
